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THE MISSING CHINESE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION CASES
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*

I
INTRODUCrION

Environmental law and theories of statutory interpretation
have developed side by side in the United States during the past
twenty-five years. Many of the leading environmental law cases
are also statutory interpretation cases. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill'-holdingthat the Endangered Species Act prevented
the completion of the $100 million Tellico Dam-is a classic environmental law case and it is also a classic statutory interpretation
case, often cited as Exhibit A for a plain meaning approach to
reading statutes. Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc 2-allowing the Environmental Protection
Agency to employ a "bubble" approach under the Clean Air
Act-is another famous environmental law case, yet Chevron is
even better known as the case which established a deferential
standard for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes.
The list of cases that are significant both to U.S. environmental
law and to U.S. statutory interpretation guidelines is much
longer, as a glance through any casebook on either legislation or
3
environmental law demonstrates.
China is different. There is no Yangzi River Authority v.
Hill. There is no Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Coun* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 1932, Indiana University; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan Law School I am grateful
for the insights shared by members of the faculty of the Wuhan University Law
School, especially Wang K4 when I lectured there in August 1995. Steve Skinner provided tremendous research assistance collecting a wide variety of inaccessible Chinese sources. I am most thankful for the comments of my wife Lisa,
whose knowledge of China far surpasses my own.
1 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Compare PETER S.
.ENELL
& RICHARD B. ST\wART, ENVIRONMNrAL
LAW & Poucy'(1994) with WILiAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHIuP P. FRicKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION. STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF

PuBUc PoucY (2d ed. 1995).
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cil-Chevron conducts operations in China, but there are few
private environmental organizations in China, let alone an organization likely to sue the government. Indeed, a search for any
case disputing the meaning of a Chinese environmental statute
would probably not be fruitful. China has enacted many environmental statutes, often patterned after foreign laws such as
those in the United States, but there are no Chinese environmental law statutory interpretation cases.
This.article examines why there are no such cases, and what
we may learn from that fact. I am indebted to the work of Professor Stewart, whose engaging article in this symposium issue
combines three of my own, seemingly distinct interests: environmental law, statutory interpretation, and China. Professor Stewart's international reputation in environmental law speaks for
itself, and the Chinese government can only profit from his advice as they seek to build their own environmental law institutions. Perhaps Professor Stewart is correct that his knowledge
about environmental law and about China exceeds his expertise
in statutory interpretation, though I suspect that he is far too
modest in describing his own familiarity with the interpretation
of statutes. I hope to complement Professor Stewart's contribution to this Symposium with some thoughts developed from my
-own work in statutory interpretation, and from my own experience studying environmental law and China.
In Part II, I begin with an oyerview of the environmental
problems facing China, the evolving role of law in China, and the
environmental statutes enacted by China in recent years. Part III
examines why cases disputing the meaning of environmental statutes are so rare in China. Drawing from Professor Stewart's observations about Chinese environmental law, I explain that many
of the reasons that such disputes do not occur in China concern
the structure of the Chinese government, the pressures against
enforcement of environmental laws, the nature of the Chinese
economy, and the Chinese tradition of resolving disputes without
litigation. These reasons offer lessons to both China and the
United States about the nature of environmental law and statutory interpretation. China needs to develop methods to enforce
its environmental laws more aggressively; the United States
needs to find other ways besides litigation to resolve many environmental disputes. The statutory interpretation rules applied by
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each nation can help determine whether either goal will be
achieved.
II
THE ENvmoNENT AND LAW IN CHINA
A.

The Environment in China

China's environmental problems are well documented. 4
Water pollution is especially bad. The number of cities suffering
from serious water shortages is three hundred and growing. The
fresh water that does exist is often polluted by untreated industrial and municipal discharges so that more than half of China's
major towns lack water that is safe to drink. Rivers, lakes, and
coastal areas all face contamination from a variety of sources.
Broader water ecosystems have deteriorated as a result of reclamation projects, unchecked pesticide and fertilizer use, and
erosion.5
The air in many Chinese cities is dangerous to breathe. According to a leading Chinese environmental official, "China has
the world's highest degree of urban air pollution and the greatest
number of heavily polluted cities," with only five of China's five
hundred cities enjoying clean air.6 The primary culprit is coal,
which is the fuel of choice throughout China for the generation
of energy. Coal.has many harmful environmental consequences
that cost China hundreds of billions of dollars annually, yet the
problem promises to worsen as the Chinese economy explodes
while efforts to replace coal with cleaner forms of energy appear
to be years away from success. 7 Particulate pollution affects
4 Much of the information that follows is contained in the paper prepared
by the Chinese government in 1994 to implement the international AGENDA 21

agreement. See CHINA'S AGENDA 21: WHITE PAPER ON CHINA'S POPULATION,
ENVIRoNMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1994) [hereinafter
AGENDA 21]. For other general descriptions of the state of the Chinese environment, see HE BOCHuAN, CHINA ON THE EDGE (1991); VACLAV SM.L,
CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1993); Charles A. Radin, Wih China's 'Mir-

acle' Pollution Surges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1995, at 47.
5 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 68, 88, 144. For a general description of the
state of China's water resources, see AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 143-45.
6 China's Top ConservationistWarns of Pollution, GLOBAL WARM-NG NETwoRK ONuNE TODAY, Apr. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 'WL
2265687, at *1 (quoting Qu Geping, former director of China's National Environmental Protection Agency).
7 See AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 68, 203; Sheila Tefft, Fueling Pollution,
SOUTH CHNA MORNING POST, Sept. 22, 1995, at 23; Patrick E. Tyler, China's
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nearly every city in China, especially northern cities and during
the winter. Emissions of sulfur dioxide produce acid rain that
has contaminated forests, soil, and crops in southern China and
has also produced harmful effects in Japan.8 These problems, in
addition to the rapid increase in the number of cars that are unequipped with modem pollution controls, make the task for
China to control its air pollution daunting. 9
China produces 600 million tons of industrial solid wastes,
100 tons of municipal solid wastes, and thirty million tons of hazardous wastes annually. Few of the wastes are treated and disposed in an environmentally responsible fashion. Such wastes
contaminate the water and the land when they are in landfills,
and the wastes that are directly deposited into the water produce
even more devastating results. China has estimated the economic losses attributable to solid wastes at nearly four billion
dollars annually.' 0
Desertification has rendered about eight percent of the land
in China unusable. Half of the desertification has resulted from
water erosion, affecting 1.79 million square kilometers at a cumulative rate of five billion tons of soil annually. Thousands of kilometers of highways and railroads are blocked by sedimentation.
Such desertification presents a disproportionate problem for
poor areas: seventy-eight percent of the 200 poorest counties in
China suffer from desertification."
Wildlife suffers due to the burgeoning human pollution and
loss of habitat. Over 100,000 species of animals and nearly
33,000 plant species exist in diverse ecosystems ranking China
eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere in biodiversity. However, fifteen to twenty percent of those species are
threatened, a proportion higher than the world average of ten to
fifteen percent. Forests, as well, are disappearing at an alarming

Inevitable Dilemma: Coal Equals Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at Al,

A8.

8 See Radin, supra note 4, at 47 (noting that the Japanese government is
providing loans to reduce acid rain produced in China because half of the sulfuric acid found in the Japanese environment originates in China).
9 For a general discussion of air pollution in China, see AGENDA 21, supra

note 4, at 203.

10 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 214 (estimating annual economic losses of
total thirty billion yuan).
11 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 180.
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rate, further reducing the habitat needed by wildlife (including
the famous pandas) to survive.1
Other environmental problems exist as well. Marine resources suffer from pollution and "an out of control fishing industry.' u3 The degradation of agricultural land continues as
fertilizer and pesticides pollute the land and as land is overused. 14 Noise levels in urban areas are very high.Us Combined
with the continued growth of China's economy and its population, the stresses on the Chinese environment have profoundly
and adversely affected the quality of life in China.
These problems now have the attention of the Chinese government. Historically, the Chinese culture has regarded nature
with great respect, though Chinese practice did not always adhere to Chinese philosophy.' 6 Communist philosophy was less
sympathetic to environmental concerns, viewing them as an exclusively western, "capitalist" problem, or conversely as evidence
of China's own economic progress. China failed to recognize the
severity of its environmental situation until the early 1960s. By
the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 the severity of pollution levels and other environmental problems in China could no
longer be ignored. The United Nations Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 marked the first time that
China played a prominent role in international environmental issues. China's environmental progress halted during the Gang of
Four era ending in the id-1970s, but environmental concerns

12 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 141, 173. The problems faced by China's
pandas are further documented in GEORGE Sc-ALLER, THE LAST PANDA
(1993).
13 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 159.
14 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 97, 105.
15 Wang Xi & Robert F. Blomquist, The Developing Environmental Last,
and Policy of the People'sRepublic of China: An Introduction andAppraisal,5

GEo. INTL ENvrTL L. REv. 25, 34 (1992).

16 China's environmental ethics are described in LESTER Ross & MacHELL
A. SiLK,ENVIRONhmNTAL LAW AND POUCY IN THE PEOpLE's REPUBUC OF
CHInA (1987); Baruch Boxer, China's Environmental Prospects, 29 AsIAN
SuRV.669, 679-80 (1989); Bruce L. Ottley & Charles C. Valauskas, China'sDe:
veloping Environmental Law: Policies,Practices and Legislation, 6 B.C IT'L

& CoMe. L. REv. 81, 84-85 (1983); Christopher Tracy, Listeningfor Sounds of
Fallen Trees: The Principlesof Forestsand Lessons from Germany and China, 3
. INT'L L. &PRAC.469,493-94 (1994); Wang &Blomquist, supranote 15, at 27;
A. Dan Tarlock, Book Review, 30 HARv.IT'L LJ.557, 560-61 (1989).
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continued to gain greater attention with Deng Xiaoping's ascent
to power in 1977.17
Chinese leaders now characterize the environment as a top
priority. Speaking in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Premier Li Peng
told the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development that China had made environmental protection "one of
our basic state policies" and had made "unremitting efforts towards this end."18 China has invested billions of dollars for environmental causes, and it has received billions more from other
countries and international organizations such as the World
Bank.' 9 China continues to educate its people about environmental issues. These efforts have convinced 99% of the Chinese
people that environmental pollution and ecological destruction
are at least "fairly serious" issues, 20 but all agree that more environmental education needs to be done.
B. Law in China
"In the four thousand years of traditional Chinese civilization, the concept and practice of law have never played a role as
17

The history of China's steps toward environmental consciousness during

the Communist era is recounted in detail in Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16,
at 94-109. See also Ross & SiLx, supra note 16, at 2-4; Cai Shouqiu & Mark
Voigts, The Development of China's EnvironmentalDiplomacy, 3 PAC. RIM L.
& PoL'y J.S-17, S-19 to S-23 (1993); Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 2829; Boxer, supra note 16, at 680-83.
18 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 3. For other expressions of the priority that
the Chinese leadership places on environmental issues, see Ross & SILK, supra
note 16, at 36-37 (reprinting article written by Li Peng); Wang & Blomquist,
supra note 15, at 35-36 (listing the goals of China's Eighth Five Year Plan approved by the National People's Congress in 1991).
19 See CmNA NEws, China to Carry Out "Cross-Century Green Project"
(published Nov. 7, 1995) <http:llwww.chinanews.comlns/news/9511/07/
110704aa.eng> (citing Xie Zhenhua, Director of China's National Environmental Protection Agency, describing China's plan to invest 150 billion RMB on
environmental projects by the end of the century); Agnes Shanley, China Sets a
New Agenda, 102 CHEMICAL ENGRIEMNG 30 (1995) (stating that China will
spend over $35 billion on environmental projects during the next five years);
Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 30 (indicating that the Chinese government invested 47 billion yuan in environmental protection from the mid-1980s
tlirough 1990); Marcus W. Brauchli, China'sSurging Industry Takes Toll on Environment, AsiAN WALL ST. J., July 26, 1994, at Al (noting that the World
Bank now spends $500 million annually on environmental projects in China).
20 Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 32 (citing a 1990 poll conducted by
the Central People's Broadcasting Station and the China Institute of Social
Surveys).
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significant as they have occupied in western history."21 In the
second century BCE, Confucianism, which emphasized classical
education and moral consciousness within a structured, societal
framework to promote social harmony, succeeded Legalism,
which relied on formal legal codes to enforce social order, as the
official state philosophy of the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 219
CE).2 This transition produced a unique tension in Chinese society, for the "rule of man" of Confucianism is philosophically
antithetical to the "rule of law" espoused by Legalism. Numerous legal codes existed throughout the Chinese dynastic era, but
legislation did not play a central role in Chinese society or even
in Chinese law. Likewise, the legal code developed by Nationalist leaders in the early 1930s was infrequently enforced as a result
of the of the inability of the Nationalist Party to achieve governing control over large segments of China.P
In order to effect the transition from New Democracy to
Communism during 1949-1953, the Communist Party engaged in
a brutal campaign to persecute "class enemies." Though this period was marked by a blatant disregard of the many substantive
and procedural protections associated with prosecutions, the
Communist Party began to lay the groundwork for a system of
laws modeled after Stalin's "socialist legality."24 This framework,
however, alternately gained and lost acceptance as China endured numerous upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution.
When Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Gang of Four lost their effort to assume control of the government, and Deng Xiaoping
consolidated his authority soon thereafter. Deng began an aggressive effort to bring China into the community of nations, to
develop the Chinese economy, and to change China's view of the
law. He actively promoted the creation of a legal system
21 ALBERT T-Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 16 (1992). For another recent overview of Chinese law, see CARLos W.". Lo, CHrNA'S LEGAL AWAKENNG: LEGAL THEORY
Am CRmnNAL JUSTICE mN DENG'S ERA (1995).
22 See CHEN, supra note 21, at 8-11; Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at
86-87.
23 CHEN, supra note 21, at 22.
24 See CHEN,supra note 21, at 24-27. See generally Lon L.Fuller, Pashukanis
and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory, 47

MICH. L. REv. 1157 (1949) (criticizing the Pashukanis' belief that law is inherently bourgeois and operates only to protect capitalism, arguing instead that

Stalin's 'socialist legality' correctly recognizes that a "state without justice [and
laws] is impossible....").
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modeled in part after western systems, albeit with unique socialist and Chinese characteristics. Beginning in 1978, the People's
Congress enacted numerous new statutes, the study and practice
of law became acceptable, and the open ideological battle between'the "rule of law" and the "rule of men" resulted in the
apparent victory of law.2 5
China has enacted hundreds of new statutes since 1978.
These statutes represent a significant change in the Chinese view
of law: historically, most legal norms were unwritten and unde26
fined, and written law was consulted only as a last resort.
China has codified legal norms since 1978 in order to eliminate
the arbitrariness condemned in most western legal systems and to
produce the predictability offered by definite legal rules.
Success in this realm, however has eluded China because of
the complex, overlapping bureaucracy, which promulgates and
interprets legislation. 27 The National People's Congress (NPC)
writes "basic laws" affecting the whole of society, including criminal and civil laws defining the structure of the government. In
addition, the Standing Committee of the NPC was empowered
by the 1982 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (the Constitution of the People's Republic of China) to promulgate legislation.28 The State Council-the executive branch of the central
government-can issue administrative regulations and rules pursuant to broad enabling statutes enacted by the NPC.29 Finally,
local People's Congresses are authorized to enact regulations in
25 These legal developments are described in detail in CHEN, supra note 21,
at 24-38; Lo, supra note 21, at 17-68; Wu Jianfan, Building China's Legal System, in CHiNA'S LEGAL DEVWLOPmENT 5-14 (John R. Oldham ed., 1986). For a
more general history of China since 1948, see JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THEF
SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 514-747 (1990).
26 Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at 86.
27 The best explanation of China's legislative process is provided by Perry
Keller, Legislation in the People's Republic of China, 23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.

REv. 653 (1989). For other descriptions, see CHEN, supra note 21, at 77-95;
Wang Wei Min, A Few Problems in Environmental Protection Legislation in
China, in Proceedings of the Sino-American Conference on Environmental
Law 189-91 (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
Law ed., 1989).
28 See CHEN, supra note 21, at 80-82; Keller, supra note 27, at 661. The
duties of the NP'C and the procedures it follows are described in CHEN, supra
note 21, at 55-59.
29 See CHiN, supra note 21, at 83-85; Keller, supra note 27, at 669-73. De-

partments of the State Council can issue rules as well, although the status of
those rules as legislation is not as clearly established. See Keller, supra note 27,
at 673-75.
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order to provide additional enforcement mechanisms for statutes
promulgated at the national level 30
China has also created a complicated administrative and judicial bureaucracy to implement its statutes. Administrative
power is exercised by the State Council and countless departments throughout the country. Judicial power rests with three
kinds of people's courts-local, special, and supreme? 1 The
Supreme People's Court serves as the highest court in China and
oversees the work of the other courts.32
Chinese courts, however, operate in a somewhat less formal
manner than courts in the United States, due in part to their relatively recent history as well as to an apparently deliberate effort
to make the justice system more accessible to the people. While
this comparatively informal structure has led to some anomalous
results, 33 Chinese courts manifest their commitment to accessibility by holding trials in the locale where the disputed event occurred; by encouraging mutually agreeable settlements instead of
issuing judicial verdicts; by educating citizens as well as adjudicating; and by using colloquial in lieu of formal language in their
published decisions? 4 In short, they are not as easily distinguished from administrative agencies as courts are in the United
States.
Furthermore, China has developed a nuanced system of
"legislative," "judicial," and "administrative" statutory interpretation. Under the Constitution, the NPC Standing Committee
has the power to interpret national laws.35 A resolution enacted
by the Standing Committee divides that interpretive authority
among several governmental institutions. 36 The Standing Committee conducts "legislative" interpretation in determining the
plain language meaning of a statute. Legislative interpretation
30 See CHEN, supra note 21, at 85-88; Keller, supra note 27, at 6S0-81.
31 See CHPN, supra note 21, at 107-12; Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at

73.

32 See generally China's Supreme People's Court Report, BBC, Mar. 29,

1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC World Summary File.
33 For example, while the Chinese Constitution and the Organic Law of the
People's Courts are committed to the principle of open trials, some courts have
construed these provisions to mean only that notice of the pending trial must be
posted. CHEN, supra note 21, at 112-15.
34 CHEN,

35

supra note 21, at 112-15.

LXNFA

art. 67, cl. 4 (1982).

Resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC Concerning the
Strengthening of Legal Interpretative Work (1981).
36
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also includes the power to amend or supplement legislation,
thereby obscuring the distinction between interpreting legislation
and enacting it. 7 The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme
People's Procuratorate (the State's prosecutor) conduct "judicial" interpretation, i.e., interpretation of the law as applied in
specific cases, which merely clarifies the original intent of the
statute. Though lower courts lack the formal power to interpret
national laws, such interpretation is recognized as inevitable in
some cases. Finally, the State Council conducts "administrative"
interpretation-answering any other questions about the specific
application of the law. Administrative interpretations are binding on other governmental agencies and on the public, but not on
the courts.38
The Standing Committee issues few legislative interpretations in practice, and most of those that do occur are announced
in press interviews, notices, and other informal statements3 9
Likewise, few self-described administrative interpretations occur
though there are many instances where the State Council's statu40
tory interpretation is implicit in an agency's choice of action.
By contrast, the Supreme People's Court, which "has emerged as
the leading state authority on the interpretation of national
laws," routinely issues published opinions on individual cases
that interpret statutes so broadly that they resemble legislative
interpretations. 41 As in other civil law systems, such opinions
generally do not serve as formal sources of law, although prior
decisions appear to enjoy some precedential value in China.
More commonly, judicial statutory interpretation is implicit in
general interpretive statements, answers to questions posed by
37 See CHEN, supra note 21, at 95-96; Keller, supra note 27, at 666 (citing
Zhao Bingshi & Wang Yong, A Discussion of the Supreme JudicialInterpretation of CriminalLaw, 1 FAXUE YANnu 61 (1988)).
38 See CHEN, supra note 21, at 96-102; Keller, supra note 27, at 666-68, 679-

80.

39 CHEN, supra note
40 CHEN, supra note

21, at 96; Keller, supra note 27, at 666-67.

21, at 97.
21, at 97-102; Keller, supra note 27, at 667-68. See also
Z.Y. James Fang & David K.Y. Tang, The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Law: Defining the Legislative History and Interpretingthe Statute, 2 . CHINESE
L. 153, 154 (1988) ("Chinese statutes are not likely to be interpreted formalistically by the courts; they are, instead, applied as a guide to mediated and negotiated dispute settlement."). But see Walter Gellhom, China's Quest for Legal
Modernity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 1, 22 (1987) (asserting that Chinese courts are
"unassertive" and that "[t]hey infrequently interpret statutes at all, let alone
inventively").
41 CHEN, supra note
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lower courts in particular cases, or even policy announcements
regarding the implementation of a statute issued jointly by administrative and legislative bodies. 42 The courts, however, are
43
unlikely to interpret administrative and local regulations.
C. Environmental Law in China
Chinese environmental law has evolved along with the entire body of Chinese law. Prior to 1978, lack of interest in both
the environment and the law resulted in a dearth of progress in
environmental law.44 The People's Congress approved the Law
on Environmental Protection-China's first general environmental statute-on a provisional basis in 1978, and passed a permanent version of the statute in 1989. 5 China began including
environmental goals in its five year plans in 198.6 Several provisions regarding environmental protection were added to
China's constitution in 1982.47 China has since enacted a series
of environmental statutes addressing air, water and marine pollution, the protection of forests and endangered species, and other
issues. There is one significant exception; China has yet to enact
a hazardous waste statute, but such action may be imminent 4s
42 CHN, supra note 21, at 98-100; Keller, supra note 27, at 668.
supra note 21, at 97-98.
44 The oldest Chinese environmental law appears to be a decree issued during the Ym Dynasty (1600-1100 BCE) which provided that "whoever abandons
trash or dust on [the] road will be punished by cutting off his hand." Wang &
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 37 (quoting HA FEI Zi Jisni, CoL.aErxoN AND
ANN TA-OiN OF WoRKS OF HAN FEI Zi 541 (1974)). For other examples of
Chinese statutes addressing environmental issues prior to 1978, see Ross &
SiuK supra note 16, at 1, 3, 65-66; Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 37-40.
45 See Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (for
trial implementation) (1979), reprinted in Ross & Sitic, supra note 16, at 28590.
46 See Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 29 & n.9 (quoting Chapter
XXXV of the Sixth Five-Year Plan covering the period from 19S1 through
1985).
47 XLANFA art. 9 (1982) (providing for state ownership of natural resources,
ensuring state protection of natural resources, and prohibiting appropriation of
or damage to natural resources); XIANFA art. 26 (1982) ("The State protects
and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and prevents and remedies pollution and other public hazards."). These and other relevant constitutional provisions are discussed in Wang & Blomquist. supra note
15, at 30, 44; Yang Chun-Xi et al., China's Treatment of Crimes Against the Environment: Using CriminalSanctions to Fight EnvironmentalDegradationin the
PRC, 8 J. CHwusE L. 145, 152-53 (1994).
48 See generally Shanley, supra note 19. For lists of China's environmental
statutes, see Jin Rui Lin & Liu Wen, Environmental Policy and Legislation in
43 CHEN,
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The central government has also promulgated regulations to implement a number of the national environmental statutes, and
provinces and local governments have enacted their own environmental statutes.49 As of 1994, China had enacted twelve national statutes, twenty national administrative regulations, over
six hundred local laws and regulations, and three hundred other
norms regulating the environment.5 0
China has created a sweeping bureaucracy to implement
these environmental statutes. The National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) has broad duties to promulgate and enforce environmental standards and to oversee and report on
progress in meeting environmental goals.51 Other central government departments must consider environmental concerns
when fulfilling their responsibilities.52 Provincial and local environmental protection agencies enforce the statutes within their
jurisdictions.5 3
There are three enforcement mechanisms available to ensure compliance with the environmental statutes. The vast majority of such enforcement proceedings occur at the
administrative level.5 4 Administrative proceedings may be
brought by NEPA or certain other agencies against violators of
environmental statutes. Alternately, the government (and conceivably a private party) may institute a civil action in court.
Finally, criminal sanctions may be imposed by a court in
some environmental cases.55 Despite these mechanisms, actual
China, inPROCEEDINGS

OF THE SINO-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRON-

LAW 166-67 (Natural Resources Law Center, Uniersity of Colorado
School of Law ed., 1989); Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 48. Many of the
statutes are reprinted in Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 285-424.
49 For a description of the relationship between these sources of law, see
Wang, supra note 27, at 185-86; Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 43-49.
50 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 15; China: "Landmark" New Regulations on
Natural Reserves Announced, BBC, Nov. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBC World Summary File.
51 See Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 32.
52 Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 73.
53 Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 73.
54 See infra text accompanying note 78.
55 These enforcement mechanisms are described in greater detail in CHENO
MENTAL

ZHENG-KANG, A BRIEF INTRODUCriON TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA

30-35 (1986); Ma Xiang Cong, Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaws in China, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SINO-AMERICAN

CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW 277-81 (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
Law ed., 1989); Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 245-49 (reprinting an article by
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enforcement
weak.56

of China's environmental statutes remains
I

WHY THERE ARE No CHnmEsB ENviRoNmENTAL
LAW STATUTORY ITrERPRETATION CASES

As described in Part II above, China is in the process of
adopting a western-style legal system with western-style statutes,
including environmental statutes. Moreover, China possesses an
administrative structure to enforce those laws, and its courts are
gaining more power to do so as well. Still, unlike their western
counterparts, Chinese cases that hinge on the disputed meaning
of an environmental statute are few and far between. Professor
Stewart has identified several reasons why this is so. I wish to
consider the reasons he has listed, as well as submit other reasons
for the absence of any statutory interpretation cases in Chinese
environmental law.
A. Lack of Separation of GovernmentalPowers in China
China's governmental powers are separated in theory, but
not in practice. Indeed, China's governmental powers are not
fully separated from the Communist Party. This intertwining of
governmental powers among different parts of the government
and the Party deters statutory interpretation cases in several
ways.
1. Existence of a One-Party System
The Communist Party rules China. To be sure, the Chinese
Constitution permits other political parties, and beginning in the
1980s the Communist Party moved to separate itself from the official functioning of the state.V Nonetheless, the Communist
Party retains all actual governmental power. The events of June
1989 in Tiananmen Square eliminate any doubt about the willingness of the Communist Party to share real power with other
Wang Ymghuai, a Chinese judge, outlining the judicial procedures for the disposition of enviionmental cases); Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 72-73.
56

See infra part I.LB.

57

These efforts are described in detail in Lo, supra note 21, at 271-74 and

Keller, supra note 27, at 656.
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political parties. 58 The power of the state is thus still inextricably
intertwined with that of the Communist Party. 59
The Communist Party essentially dictates the content and
nature of Chinese law. At one point, the commonly accepted
view in China was that Communist Party policy and Chinese law
were.coextensive. That view has come into disfavor as Chinese
academics, with tacit support from Deng, have expressed support
for a legal system in which law possesses independent force, so
that the rule of men (to wit, the leaders of the Communist Party)
is giving way to the rule of law.60 Although Party and government officials are now at least nominally subject to the law, 61 the
transformation to the rule of law is not complete. Examples of
Party influence on the legal process abound, during both the creation and the implementation of Chinese law. 62 The problem is
particularly acute in environmental cases, where Party intervention may be needed to assure local enforcement of the law but
where such intervention robs the la, of its independent force. 63
58 See Keller, supranote 27, at 657 ("The Chinese political crisis of 1989 may
well result in a revision of the policy of separating Party and state functions and
a re-assertion of Party authority over the daily administration of the legal
system.").
59 Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 10-11; Hikota Koguchi, Some Observations
About "JudicialIndependence" in Post-Mao China, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
195, 195, 199, 202, 206, 208-09 (1987); Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Some Observations on Socialist Legality of the People's Republic of China, 17 CAL. W. INT'L
LJ.102, 109-10 (1987); Liu Nanping, "JudicialReview" in China: A Comparative Perspective, 14 Rtv. SOCIAmST L. 241, 251-52 (1988).
60 For different perspectives on the degree to which China has moved from
the rule of men to the rule of law, see generally Lo, supra note 21; John C.
Nagle, The Rule of Law in Mainland China, 14 AM. ASIAN REv. 147 (1996).
61 See An Instruction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party Concerning the Full Implementation of the Criminal Law and the Law of
Criminal Procedure, reprinted and translatedin Koguchi, supra note 59, at 251
("[F]rom the Party Central Committee on down to organizations on the most
basic level, and from the Chairman of the CCP to the individual Party member,
'all of them should, without exception, conform to the law.").
62 Professor Lo lists many such examples, along with counterexamples
where the law has prevailed against party officials. Lo, supra note 21, at 39, 75.
Another powerful illustration involves the death penalty: the president of the
Supreme People's Court has acknowledged the Party's primary jurisdiction
over cases involving capital punishment, the criminal code notwithstanding. See
Koguchi, supra note 59, at 199, 206 ("[T]he court was, and is, required to seek
instructions from the Party in handling important or difficult cases."); Liu,
supra note 59, at 251 ("The obvious fact is that the Chinese Communist Party
has the last word in every decision, if it so desires.").
63 See Ross & SiNc, supra note 16, at 11; see also Boxer, supra note 16, at
683 ("Party authority still reigns supreme in China, and major pollution and
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As Dan Tarlock theorizes, "[a]ll law, but especially law which
strengthens the legal power of the individual against the state, as
much of western environmental law does, is destabilizing to authoritarian regimes." 64 China continues to be controlled by state
and Party officials instead of by the "rule of law" and individual
rights.
The Communist Party's power over the legal system extends
to Chinese statutory law. Statutes are needed as an alternative to
allowing individual government (or Party) officials to decide
what is or is not acceptable conduct. 6 While the Party lacks the
formal constitutional power to enact legislation, it initiates the
process of drafting new statutes, including new environmental
statutes.66 The Party also influences the interpretation'of statutes
once they are enacted.
The Communist Party's continuing influence provides one
explanation for the lack of disputes as to the meaning of Chinese
environmental statutes. The old notion that the Party's will is
tantamount to the law's command still lingers today. It may be
difficult to challenge the government's interpretation of a statute
even if that statute's apparent meaning clashes with the reading
espoused by the Party. The Party's influence on statutory interpretation is often indirect, and the Party's will is most likely to
manifest itself in statutory interpretation through oiher features
of the Chinese governmental structure.
2. Absence of an Independent Judiciary
The Chinese Constitution provides for a judiciary that is independent from the other branches of government. 67 That formal independence is tempered in reality by a variety of
constraints on the power of Chinese courts. Chinese judges are
resource cases are resolved politically at high levels where disputes over tradeoffs between economic and environmental costs are usually resolved in favor of
economic production interests.").
64 Tarlock, supra note 16, at 560.
65 Ross & Saic, supra note 16, at 5.

66 See Leung, supra note 59, at 109; Richard B. Stewart, Speech at the New
York University Environmental Law Journal Annual Banquet (Mar. 27, 1995)
in 5 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L 562 (1996).
67 XANFA art. 126 (1982) ("People's courts shall exercise their authority

independently according to the law and shall not be interfered with by an administrative organ, organization, or individual.").
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poorly trained and held in low regard in society.63 The National
People's Congress selects the justices who serve on the Supreme
Judicial Court.69 Once chosen, a justice can serve no more than
two consecutive terms,70 and may be removed by the legislature
71
at any time without cause.
Chinese judges are subject to extensive influence from the
legislature and executive departments. Professor Stewart and
many other observers have characterized the judiciary as beholden to the Party. 72 The once commonly held belief that "[a]ll
important judicial matters should be decided by the Party organization, including not only problems of political ideology or policy, but also concrete cases" is exemplified by a 1958 article
entitled "Refute Jia Qian's Anti-Party Nonsense about 'Independent Adjudication."' 73 The Chinese attitude toward the
judiciary has changed greatly since 1958,74 but dispute continues
over the actual independence of the judiciary.
Contrast China with the United States. The American judiciary is independent and powerful. Courts invalidate statutes enacted by Congress and the President as unconstitutional; they
hold that regulations promulgated by executive agencies are unauthorized by statute; they overturn specific administrative enforcement decisions; and they reverse criminal convictions.
However, the independence of U.S. courts is not unlimited: Congress can curtail the jurisdiction or reduce the budget of the federal courts, and Presidents have long relied on their appointment
68 The judges' lack of training is described in Lo, supra note 21, at 136-37;
Koguchi, supra note 59, at 201. The low status of the judiciary is described in
Stewart, supra note 66, at 557; see also Koguchi, supra note 59, at 202.
69 See XIANFA art. 62, cl. 7 (1982) (providing for the election of the Chief
Justice by the National People's Congress); XMANFA art. 67, cl. 11 (1982) (pro-

viding for the appointment of other justices by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress).
70 XIANFA art. 124 (1982).

71 See Leung, supra note 59, at 108 n.36 (describing how Articles 62, 63, and
67 of the Constitution allow the National People's Congress to remove justices
at will).
72 See, e.g., Ross & SiLK,supra note 16, at 209; Koguchi, supra note 59, at
195-97, 200; Leung, supra note 59, at 110; Stewart, supra note 66, at 557.
73 Koguchi, supra note 59, at 196 (quoting Feng Ruoquan, Refute Jia Qian's
Anti-PartyNonsense About 'Independent Adjudication,' 1 ZHENOFA YANJIU 20
(1958)).
74 See, e.g., China's Supreme People's Court Report, supra note 32, at 11
(claiming that "courts persisted in exercising judicial authority independently

and according to the law, and resolutely opposed and resisted the influence of
local and departmental protectionism and other interference").
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power to shape the judiciary's collective view. Many state judges
are subject to the additional influence of popular election. Those
constraints, however, only work as crude and often ineffective
mechanisms for the political branches of the government to control the courts in the United States.
The independence and authority of the U.S. judiciary encourages parties to seek formal adjudication of conflicts, including environmental disputes. Private parties frequently challenge
the environmental policies of executive agencies knowing that
the courts enjoy the authority to overrule illegal executive conduct. For example, court decisions invalidating numerous proposed executive actions have blocked repeated efforts to craft a
political compromise between environmental and timber interests in the Pacific Northwest. 75 Challenges to governmental action often involve a dispute concerning the meaning of the
statute that provides the government with regulatory authority,
or defines the scope of illegal private conduct.
Many environmental statutes vest the federal courts of appeals with original jurisdiction to decide whether agency regulations properly interpret the statute they are designed to
implement.76 Likewise, environmental statutes grant the federal
courts jurisdiction to hear challenges to administrative enforcement actions; 77 those cases often present, as well, disputes regarding statutory construction. Much U.S. environmental law,
therefore, presupposes an independent judiciary that vail not
hesitate to rule that the executive has misinterpreted its charge.
3. The Primacy of Executive Authority
The absence of Chinese environmental statutory interpretation cases is also due in part to the fact that China offers few
opportunities for individuals to challenge agency resolution of
environmental disputes in the courts. The vast majority of such
75 See NMu.. & STEWART, supra note 3, at 1145-SO.

76 See; e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994) (directing that petitions for review
of EPA rules and regulations implementing the Clean Air Act (CAA) must be
filed in the D.C. Circuit); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (1994) (petitions for review of
EPA rules and regulations implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) must be filed in the D.C. Circuit).
77 See eg, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994) (directing that petitions for review
of EPA orders implementing the CAA must be filed in the federal circuit courts
of appeals); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (1994) (petitions for review of EPA permit and
interim authorization decisions under RCRA must be filed in the federal circuit
courts of appeals).
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conflicts in China are resolved administratively. Lester Ross and
Mitchell Silk explained that
[i]n keeping with both traditional and communist Chinese culture, violations of law and civil disputes are usually handled
outside of court. Environmental protection officials claim that
over 90 percent of their actions are accepted by the parties
concerned, although they concede that their decisions take account of factors like the ability to pay fines or make restitution
and also that political realities temper their independence. Of
the remainder, the overwhelming majority are resolved
through semiformal mediation
involving the regulator, the
78
polluter(s), and the victim(s).

The situation in the United States is dramatically different, with
many environmental disputes entering the courts each year.
In this area, the interpretive rules followed by each country
are determinative. In the United States, the environmental statutes enacted by Congress routinely empower the implementing
agency to issue regulations interpreting the general command of
the statute in particular situations. 79 The Supreme Court in
Chevron instructed federal courts to defer to any reasonable
agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 0 The knowledge
that the courts are reluctant to overturn an agency's interpretation of a statute' should operate as a disincentive to affected parties wishing to contest that interpretation in court. Whether or
not Chevron has actually had such an effect is subject to empirical debate,81 but a likely explanation for continued litigation in a
78 Ross & Si.K, supra note 16, at 243; accord Joseph R. Profaizer, Note,
Economic Development and Environmental Law in China's Special Economic
Zones, 28 TEx. IN' L.J. 319, 341 (1993) (noting that "the judiciary rarely par-

ticipates in environmental enforcement" and that "civil enforcement has been
limited primarily to administrative and civil actions, if the authorities take any
action at all against polluters"). For example, Ross and Silk observed that
"only two or three dozen of the 1,600 pollution-related conflicts that occur in
Chongqing in a year are resolved in the courts." Ross & SILK, supranote 16, at
7.
79 See supra part I. The Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) constitutes the most notable exception.
See Kelley ,. EPA, 25 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that EPA lacks the power

to issue regulations defining the scope of lender liability under CERCLA), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
80 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
L.E. 969 (1992); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Dui L.J.
984; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court'sNew Hypertextualism: An InviYALE
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world governed by Chevron is that the courts are more villing to
question agency statutory interpretations than Chevron would
suggest.
Chinese environmental statutes also delegate the power to
develop detailed regulatory schemes to administrative agencies
(albeit subject to the approval of the State Council)."" But China
goes further than the United States in that it vests an even
greater amount of interpretive authority in administrative agencies. As one Chinese professor explained:
Under the Chinese legal system, judges in China have either
no power to make law or no authority to interpret the law at
their own will. The interpretation of law is the responsibility
of the National Congress and the State Supreme Court. In
most administrative laws including environmental law, there
are specific provisions which state that the National Congress
delegated its power to interpret law to the executive organizations in charge of enforcement.P
Administrative interpretations of a statute are not binding on a
court, but courts will seek to avoid conflicting interpretations by
consulting the appropriate legislative committee or administrative agency before interpreting a statute. 4 Additionay, Chinese
courts "must refer all questions of interpretation to the authorized administrative body for interpretation."' S Thus, if an environmental dispute does reach the courts, Chinese judges will not
overturn the agency's interpretation of the applicable statute.
Although Chevron does affect statutory interpretation, it
does not produce nearly as much deference to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) (or any other agency's) interpretation of U.S. environmental laws as that observed in the Chinese
system. Only if Congress enacted a statute withdrawing the juristation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. I.
REv. 749 (1995). For a study of Chevron's relevance to tax cases, see John F.
Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35 (1995).
82 See, e.g., Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, art. 45 (1984), reprinted in Ross & Sax, supra note 16, at 312; Forestry Law, art. 40 (1984),

reprinted in Ross & SaLK,supra note 16, at 349; Marine Environmental Protection Law, art. 47 (1982), reprinted in Ross & Siut, supra note 16, at 31S-19.

83 CHENG, supra note 55, at 2-3; accord Keller, supra note 27, at 653 (observing that "interpretation of law is, in most cases, the preserve of administrative authorities rather than of the courts").

84 See Keller, supra note 27, at 668, 679.
85 Keller, supra note 27, at 679-80 (citing the author's unpublished
with an official of the Supreme People's Court).

interview
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diction of the federal courts to reject EPA's interpretation of a
statute, or if the courts extended Chevron so that all agency statutory interpretations must be sustained, would the United States
achieve a position comparable to China's.
B.

The Lack of Enforcement of Chinese
EnvironmentalStatutes
The way in which Chinese environmental statutes are enforced-or not enforced-further explains the paucity of cases
interpreting Chinese environmental statutes. Lester Ross and
Mitchell Silk have identified four primary ways in which China
enforces its environmental policies: exhortational campaigns, administrative regulations and controls, economic incentives, and
legal sanctions.8 6 Often, however, China either fails to enforce
its environmental policies in particular circumstances, or does
not enforce them at all. This failure to enforce environmental
statutes reduces the need to interpret them, as the lack of cases
indicates.
1. Failure of the Chinese Government to Enforce
, Environmental Statutes
The Chinese government's inability to enforce its own environmental statutes is attributable to several factors. In China,
the implementation of national environmental policies rests
largely on ill equipped or unmotivated local officials who often
fail to zealously enforce environmental regulations.8 7 Many local
officials, through lack of training, remain unaware of environmental issues or are ignorant of statutory environmental requirements. Where some local officials are merely disinterested in
environmental matters,88 others exploit their enforcement powers for personal gain.8 9 Regardless of their level of environmental awareness or concern, almost all local officials must balance
86

87

Ross & SINK, supra note 16, at 207-09

See Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 64 (noting that some local offi-

cials have ignored or circumvented environmental impact assessment require-

ments). The enforcement problem is not limited to environmental statutes. See
Keller, supranote 27, at 653-54 ("The implementation of the law often depends
on the cooperation of local officials who lack sufficient interest or resources to
put complex legislation into effect.").
88 See Ross -&Si, supra note 16, at 11 ("Chinese environmental officials

repeatedly complain that their policies do not receive adequate support from
local officials, many of whom fail to take violations of the law seriously .....
89 See Stewart, supra note 66, at 564.
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the costs of environmental enforcement with the demands of
rapid economic development.90 Local officials also control the
funding of local courts, thereby holding a potent weapon against
judges who would be more willing to enforce the law despite adverse economic consequences.91 Moreover, some judges give low
priority to environmental cases, even absent pressure from local officials.
Even when the will to enforce the law exists, the resources
needed to do so may be lacking. China, like many other less developed nations, takes the position that western nations should
bear the brunt of the economic burden of achieving environmental goals.93 Foreign countries and international organizations
such as the World Bank have invested billions of dollars in environmental projects in China.94 The Chinese government has preferred to pursue international assistance with the development of
environmental technology rather than to promulgate stringent
environmental regulations with which China's fledgling industries will be rl-equipped to comply. But technology is not a substitute for enforcement. As Professor Stewart notes, even the
most advanced environmental technology serves no purpose if
industries continue to avoid the use of new equipment due to its
expense.95 Similarly, the lack of enforcement resources cannot
90 See Profaizer, supra note 78, at nn. 124-25; Stewart, supra note 66, at 564
(observing that a municipality or a local official often has a direct economic
stake in a particular enterprise); Benjamin Kang Lin, China Says Efforts to
Curb Pollution Pay Off, Reuters, Nov. 14, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Newds Li-

brary, Reuters World Service File.
91 Keller, supra note 27, at 682.
92 See Ma, supra note 55, at 280.
93 See Cai & Voigts, supra note 17, at S-33 to S-35 (explaining why "developed countries should bear the majority of the financial burden of cleaning up

the global environment"); China, UNDP Host Meeting on China's Agenda,

Xinhua News Agency July 7, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua
File (Chinese official indicating that China expects financial support and technology transfers to achieve its environmental goals). China recognizes, however, that it needs to increase its own investment in environmental protection.
See Ma, supra note 55, at 273; Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 53 n.140
(citing study concluding that China spends 0.7% of its national income on environmental protection, whereas at least 1.5% is needed to fully address the
problem).
94 See supra text accompanying note 19.
95 Stewart, supra note 66, at 563; accordWang & Blomquist, supra note 15,

at 66 (confirming that "pollution control devices are sometimes dismantled or
taken out of use because of operating costs or operational difficulties").

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

N.YU. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

(Volume 5

continue to justify the willful disregard of environmental
96
statutes.
This is not to say that the Chinese government never enforces its environmental statutes. The government now places a
high priority on, environmental issues, 97 and the need to improve
enforcement has been acknowledged. Stricter environmental enforcement is becoming more common: in 1979, an equipment
operator at a chemical plant was sentenced to two years imprisonment for allowing twenty-eight tons of liquid cyanide to escape
into an adjacent river;93 the Hunan Province Environmental Protection Bureau vetoed thirteen petitions to upgrade businesses in
1989 and 1990 because of their poor environmental performances; 99 a number of factories have been shut down because of
their pollution; 100 and poachers have even been executed for killing endangered pandas.' 0 ' The Chinese government trumpets
such examples, and it is increasing its attention to environmental
enforcement. But such aggressive action remains the exception,
not the rule.
Whatever the reason for the government's failure to enforce
its environmental statutes, the result is a dearth of statutory interpretation. The meaning of a statute becomes an issue only
when two or more parties initiate a dispute about the statute, and
therefore there are no such disputes absent attempts to enforce
that sfatute. Thus, the number of environmental law statutory
interpretation cases can be expected to correlate with the amount
of government enforcement of the environmental statutes, which
is quite low overall.
96 An example of the problems which result from the lack of enforcement
resources occurred in 1991 when complaints about a chemical factory's air pollution resulted in the factory deciding to move closer to the affected residents
because the local government lacked the funds to move the factory to a safer

location. Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 60.
97 See, e.g.,, AGENDA 21, supra note

4, at 18.

98 The official report of that case is reprinted in

Ross & SILK, supra note 16,

at 250-58.
99 Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 63.
at 353.
*101 Pan Wenshi, New Hope for China'sPandas, 187 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
100 See, e.g., Profaizer, supra note 78,

100,

105 (1995). 'For other examples of China's enforcement of its environmental
laws, see Ross & SIK, supranote 16, at 268-81; Ottley & Valauskas, supra note
16, at 108, 125-26; Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 57, 74-75 & nn.279, 282,
284-86.
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2. Obstacles to Private Enforcement of Chinese Environmental
Statutes
Private citizens, organizations, and businesses face enormous difficulties in bringing environmental cases to court in
China. While Chinese citizens have the formal right to bring environmental disputes-including environmental disputes vth the
government-into court, 102 instances of such suits are quite
rare. 0 3 Further hampering the ability to sue is the absence of
any Chinese analog to the tort of nuisance or other common law
actions whereby those adversely affected by pollution can seek
relief. 04
Since all U.S. environmental statutes contain provisions authorizing citizen suits, the United States has had many cases interpreting environmental statutes. The ability of private parties
to initiate environmental litigation precludes the government
agencies charged with implementing environmental statutes from
enjoying a monopoly over statutory interpretation. In the
United States, a private citizen can act to enforce an environmental statute even when the government has determined that the
statute does not apply to the circumstances. This is not true in
China.
Citizen suits also allow private parties in the United States
to use environmental statutes to block projects that have been
proposed or approved by the government, whereas Chinese citizens have no such right. This contrast is best illustrated by two
dams: the Telico Dam inTennessee and the Three Gorges Dam
in China. The Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency, interpreted the Endangered Species Act as inapplicable to the
102 NEPA Article 8 apparently grants all citizens "the right to supervise, accuse and bring law suits against units or individuals who cause pollution and
damage to the environment," see Ma, supra note 55, at 276 (quoting the statute), although another translation excludes the right to bring law suits, see Ross
& Siuc, supra note 16, at 77-78 (quoting NEPA as creating "the right to supervise, inform against, and accuse any departments or individuals of causing environmental pollution and damage"). See also Wang & Blomquist, supra15, at 73
("Citizens may bring cases, including environmental cases, before the courts
according to the rules set by the Civil Procedure Law.").

103 See Stewart, supra note 66, at 558 ("Rarely does anybody sue the government as such. In some cases lower officials have been sued, but that is

exceptional.")
104

See Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at 89 (noting the historic absence

of common law nuisance suits in China). But see Ma, supra note 55, at 281

(describing environmental disputes as "actually civil tort disputes").
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completion of the Tellico Dam. A citizen suit brought by local
opponents of the project resulted in the Supreme Court holding
otherwise.105 In contrast, the Chinese government presses forward with the construction of the Three Gorges Dam despite
both local and worldwide concern about its environmental
ramifications. 0 6 Chinese citizens were afforded a number of opportunities to register their concerns about the project,10 7 but the
Chinese courts have yet to be presented with a case suggesting
that construction of the dam would violate China's environmental statutes. This is so even though one can easily construct an
argument parallel to the successful U.S. argument in TVA v. Hill:
a State Council circular orders that "[a]ll economic activities that
affect the breeding and survival of endangered wildlife in their
main nesting area should be banned,"108 and the Three Gorges
Dam is expected to render many species extinct.1 09 But the difficulty in and ramifications of a citizens suit bringing the issue into
court precludes any statutory interpretation, despite the broad
substantive coverage of the regulation.
3. Lack of Economic Incentive to Challenge Administrative
Interpretationsof Chinese Environmental Statutes
Even if a party faces a government enforcement action for
violation of a Chinese environmental statute, the relatively mild
penalties for violation of those statutes often discourage protracted and expensive court cases contesting the government's interpretation. Mere disagreement with the interpretation of a
statute will not result in a contested case unless the adversely
affected party will suffer consequences exceeding the cost of litigation; in China many parties who disagree with the government's interpretation of an environmental statute will choose to
pay the nominal fine instead. Effluent fees are often smaller
than the cost of complying with the statute, and violators can
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
See, e.g., Sandra Burton, Taming the River Wild, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at
62; David Dahmen, Yangtze Dam Could Be Catastrophic,Warns Author, Inter
Press Serv., Apr. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2260592.
105
106

107

See Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 57.

108 State Council Circular on the Stringent Protection of Endangered Wildlife
§ 6 (1983), reprinted in Ross & Sic, supra note 16, at 384.

109 See Marian E. Sullivan, Note, The Three Gorges Dam Project: The Need
for a Comprehensive Assessment, 8 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 109, 120 (1995)
(describing wildlife threatened by the dam),
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generally recover what fees they do pay in order to purchase the
equipment required to meet statutory standards in the future.110
Likewise, some violators of China's endangered species legislation have escaped with fines of less than two dollars."' Indeed,
some Chinese environmental statutes have failed to provide for
any penalties, thus precluding any enforcement of the underlying
substantive requirements." 2 The incentives to contest the stat3
ute's directives are therefore negligible.11
Contrast that situation with the U.S. system for allocating
allowances to emit sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act's new
acid rain effluent trading scheme. Congress drafted nearly thirty
different formulae to be used in determining the initial allocation
of emission allowances, a single, non-recurrent event. But because the financial consequences of receiving more allowances
often reached millions of dollars, numerous affected parties sued
to challenge EPA's interpretation of statutory provisions that
could only apply to a handful of utilities and which would only
apply once. 114 Those cases would have no future effect in defining the contours of the regulatory scheme, but the affected parties brought them anyway because of the enormous financial
stakes.
C. The Nature of China'sEconomy
China aspires to become a "socialist market economy. 11' s
At present, the market component is far more obvious than the
socialist component. Two features of China's economy provide
110 See Jin & Liu, supra note 48, at 175; Ross & Snux, supra note 16, at 203.
But see Shanley, supra note 19, at 30 (indicating that 200,000 Chinese plants had
paid $23 billion in pollution fines since the late 1980s); Wang & Blomquist,
supra note 15, at 70-71.
11 Ye Mimgzhao, Legal Protectionof Wild FaunaandFlora,20 ENvrL. POL'Y
& L. 216, 219 (1990).
112 Josephine Ma, Environment Law Breakers to Face Prison, Sourm CHINA
MORNiNG PosT, Aug. 12, 1994, at 9 (quoting Xie Zhenhua, the director of
NEPA, as stating that no one had been charged for violating certain environmental statutes because no penalties were specified in the statutes).,
113 There are indications, however, that China is becoming more willing to
include harsher sanctions in its environmental statutes and actually to impose
such sanctions. See Wang & Bloomquist, supra note 15, at 74 (listing possible
sanctions for violating the 1989 Environmental Protection Law).
114 See Indianapolis Power & ight Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d 643 (D.C.Cir. 1995);
Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Madison Gas & Elem.
Co. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1994).
115 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 23.
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additional explanation for .the dearth of cases interpreting Chinese environmental statutes. First, the government is losing control over economic activity throughout China. This is especially
true in the special economic zones, and in southern and interior
provinces far from the attention of Beijing. Second, the government owns and operates large sectors of China's economy, and it
is difficult to enforce the law against state-owned entities. As a
result of these features, businesses that are subject to the strictures of China's environmental laws often operate without fear
that environmental regulations will be enforced. This problem
relates to the general difficulties regarding the enforcement of
Chinese environmental statutes described above, yet the special
characteristics of China's economy merit separate attention.
1. Lack of Governmental Control Over the Growing Private
Economy
The sheer size and rapid growth of China's economy present
a serious challenge for any government regulation of private
business, including environmental regulation. Since the early
1980's, China has deliberately encouraged private economic activity. The government established several special economic
zones (SEZs), most notably in southern coastal areas, to relax
traditional state control and to stimulate private and foreign investment. As the SEZs flourished, the economies of interior
provinces also began to grow.
The results have been phenomenal. China's gross national
product has increased at nearly ten percent annually in recent
years. 116 China is expected to have the largest economy in the
world by the early twenty-first century. 117 Such spectacular economic growth illustrates the need for comprehensive environmental laws. Moreover, much of the recent economic growth has
occurred in industries that pose substantial environmental chal116 See Cai & Voigts, supra note 17, at S-26 (stating that China's GNP grew at
an average of 8.8% annually between 1981 and 1991); Anhui Delegation Heads
for US, CanadaSeeking Investment, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File (stating that China's GNP is ex-.
pected to grow 10% in 1995); National Assembly Address; Jiang Reviews
Chinese Reforms, BBC, Nov. 20, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC
World Summary File (stating that China's GNP grew at an average of 9.8% per
annum from 1979 to 1994).
117 Hamish McRae, A Seismic Shift to the East Economics, THn
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Independent
File, at *4.
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lenges: energy, manufacturing, transportation, and mining. Even
the small township and village businesses promoted by the government are, in Professor Stewart's words, "enormously poluting ventures."' 18
The government has struggled to retain control over the explosive growth in private economic activity. Black markets
thrive even as legal business enterprises ignore or are oblivious
to developing legal requirements, concerning securities, labor,
safety, and numerous other issues. The problem is particularly
acute with respect to environmental regulation because of the
traditionally lax regulations, which have only recently given priority to environmental concerns over economic development.
As noted above, local governments face numerous obstacles in
enforcing local and national environmental rules. Initially there
was no environmental regulation of the SEZs; only now are such
controls being developed. 119 The central government is aware of
these problems, but so far it has been unable to exercise effective
environmental control in many regions.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of ineffective environmental control is that of the mining industry. A recent New York
imes article described "[a] frenzied and chaotic gold rush ...
under way across vast expanses of rural China, where newly
wealthy 'gold lords' and the peasants who toil and fight for them
' O The attraction of
are challenging the authority of the state."1
striking it rich has lured some of the 130 million "surplus labor"
rural workers, who normally earn $120 annually, in the same way
that gold lured thousands to western U.S. states in the middle of
the previous century. Anarchy prevails in many rural areas
where the central and local governments have lost functional
118 Stewart, supra note 66, at 563. See also AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 103
(agreeing that village and township enterprises cause serious environmental
damage); accord Chan Wai-Fong, Economic Growth Leaves a Dirty Trail,
SouTH CHNA MoRNNG PosT, Nov. 29, 1994, at 11 (Chinese environmental
officials complaining that township enterprises had become "a major headache"
because of the environmental problems they create).
119 See also Ross & SiL, supra note 16, at 267; Cai & Voigts, supra note 17,
at S-27 to S-28. See generally Profaizer, supra note 78 (describing the environ-

mental laws applicable in SEZs). For a case study of environmental controls in
the Shenzhen SEZ, see K.C. Lam, EnvironmentalProtection in the Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone: Achievements, Problems,and Implications,in CHINA'S
SPECtAL ECONOMIC ZoNEs: POLIa s, PROBLEMS ANm PROSPECTS 65-83 (Y.C.
Jao & C.K. Leung eds., 1986).
12 Patrick E. Tyler, Gold Hunters, Defying Beijing, Mine Vast Areas of Rural
China, N.Y. Tmms, July 17, 1995, at Al.
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governing authority to the private miners who have fought
pitched battles for prime mining land. Environmental controls
have fared no better than basic criminal law enforcement. For
example, "[o]ne mining camp was dumping tons of sediment into
a tributary of the Yellow River within sight of police patrols and
near a large highway sign that proclaimed the river a 'land and
river erosion protected area." 121
The situation created where a lack of resources and the
structure of the legal system itself operate to curtail environmental enforcement resembles problems in the arena of statutory interpretation. Businesses that operate outside of government
control have no need to, and therefore do not, interpret environmental statutes. Additionally, the government is occupied by the
pressing need to establish an enforceable legal framework within
which businesses outside of government control may operate.
Thus, the finer points of statutory interpretation are pushed
aside. Cases involving statutory interpretation presuppose a controversy between two or more parties about the meaning of a
statute in a particular circumstance. Such controversies do not
arise when a segment of the economy operates outside the effective reach of the law.
2. Difficulty of Enforcing Chinese EnvironmentalStatutes
Against State-Run Enterprises
The large sectors of China's economy that are owned and
operated by the state present a different challenge for environmental regulation. Before the 1980s, China contended that environmental problems were unique to market economies. The
environmental devastation of the former Soviet Union conclusively disproved that hypothesis, 1 - and China's leaders now recognize that entities run by the government itself can be primary
causes of pollution and other environmental problems. Statutes
are therefore needed "in order to compel other state institutions
to modify their customary forms of behavior involving the discharge of untreated wastes and other acts recently defined as socially undesirable."' 2
121
122

Id
One

of the most graphic depictions of the abysmal environmental condi-

tions in the former Soviet Union is found in Mike Edwards, Pollution in the
Former U.S.S.R.: Lethal Legacy, 186 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 70 (1994).
123 Ross & Smx, supra note 16, at 5.
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Here the dilemma faced by China is similar to that faced by
the United States: how can the government regulate itself? In
the United States, the activities of the federal government, especially those related to military production, cause some of the
most pressing environmental problems. In response, the United
States has worked to institutionalize environmental requirements
into the normal government decision-making process by extending the reach of federal environmental statutes to the actions
of government agencies.124 China is taking many similar steps.
The Environmental Protection Law requires all Chinese agencies
to consider the environmental effects of their actionsm The
"three at the same time" principle requires the government to
attend to environmental issues at each stage of a development
126
project.
Chinese leaders have sought to encourage governmental
officials to comply with such requirements by stressing the importance of environmental protection. But if a Chinese governmental agency does not comply with an applicable environmental
statute, it is extremely unlikely that the agency's statutory violation will be reviewed by a court. In the United States, the availability of citizen suits provides one mechanism by which disputes
about the government's compliance with an environmental statute-and the accompanying disputes about the meaning of an
environmental statute-may be brought into court. As noted
above in Part I, section C, China lacks a comparable
procedure. 12 7

124 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994) (directing federal facilities to comply
with all federal, state, and local water pollution requirements); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(a)(1) (1994) (subjecting federal facilities to the requirements of

CERCLA).

125 Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 5
(1979) ("[Government] at all levels must effectively protect the environment.
While formulating national economic development plans, overall arrangements
for environmental protection and improvement shall be made, and such protection and improvements shall be carried out conscientiously and in an organized

manner."), reprinted in Ross & Sax, supra note 16, at 285.
126 Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 6
("Facilities for preventing pollution and other hazards to the public must be
designed, buil and put into operation simultaneously with the principal project.") (emphasis added), reprintedin Ross & Stic, supra note 16, at 286. For
an overview of the "three at the same time" principle and its application, see
Wang & Blomquist, supra note 15, at 65-67.
127

See supra Part II.B.
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Moreover, China does not permit its environmental protection agencies to sue other governmental agencies that have allegedly violated an environmental statute in their zeal to pursue a
-development project. In this respect, however, China is like the
United States, where separation of powers may prevent one organ of government from suing another. U.S. parties have yet to
succeed in persuading any governmental agency to sue one of its
counterparts.128 EPA has had to rely on expanded administrative
powers and on executive orders that command other agencies to
consider various environmental concerns.' 2 9 Nonetheless, the
dispute continues in the environmental context, where environmentalists and others often press to give EPA authority to sue
other departments for violating environmental laws. EPA has
also called for the imposition of fines or stipulated penalties on
other agencies that violate environmental laws. 130 If the government were able to sue itself, there might be many more cases
contesting the meaning of environmental statutes.
D. The Nature of Chinese Environmental Statutes
Most of China's environmental statutes are written in general language. Consider the Environmental Protection Law,
Which was designed "only to outline China's basic policies on environmental matters. 1 31 It commands that "[t]he waters of rivers, lakes, seas, and reservoirs must be protected and a good
quality of water maintained,"' 32 and it requires that "[e]ffective
measures ... be taken to eliminate smoke and dust from all
smoke-emitting equipment, industrial kilns and furnaces, motordriven vehicles, and boats and ships.' 33 The use of general language suggests that statutes still perform a rhetorical role in
China, offering direction to those whose activities implicate the
environmental issues described in the statute, but not necessarily
128 See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal
Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 893 (1991); Note, Judicial
Resolution of Inter-Agency Legal Disputes, 89 YALE L.. 1595 (1980).
129 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (requiring federal agencies to consider the effects of their actions on environmental justice),
13o See S. REP. No. 67, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1991) (observing that "penal-

ties serve as a powerful deterrent to noncompliance" by federal facilities).
131

Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at 113.

Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 11
supra note 16, at 286.
133 Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 19
(1979), reprinted in Ross & SiNK, supra note 16, at 287.
132

(1979), reprintedin Ross & SiLK,

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

1996]

CHINESE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES

anticipating litigation over the application of the statute in partic-

ular cases.1 34 The "provisional" nature of some important Chinese environmental statutes further discourages a series of cases
135
that may define more precisely the applicable commands.
By contrast, many U.S. environmental statutes are excruciatingly detailed. The complexity of the Clean Air Act,13 for example, resulted from a struggle between a host of competing
interests-environmentalists and industry, states and the federal
government, eastern states with highly sulfurous coal and western states with much cleaner coal, midwestern states with heavy
industry and eastern states experiencing the effects of acid rainthat were mediated at the time by a Democratic Congress -and a
Republican President. The specific statutory language embodies
the numerous compromises that were necessary to produce a bill

agreeable to the various interests. As a result, the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments virtually invite litigation if the government fails
137
to implement them to the letter.
134

See Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at 122 (describing both the law on

Environmental Protection and a state council decision affirming it as "a policy

statement rather than a set of comprehensive rules"); Profaizer, supra note 78,
at 335 (contending that "vague national guidelines make it difficult for local
authorities to enforce the laws"); Stewart, supra note 66, at 565; Yang, supra
note 47, at 181 (explaining how criminal environmental sanctions could be
"more persuasive by their mere presence than by their use, more valuable as
additional means of exhortation than as grounds for prosecution"). Professor
Ma made a similar point when he observed that the enforcement of Chinese
environmental statutes is difficult because those statutes "are not completed
and corresponding legal regulations are not fully established." Ma, supra note
55, at 283. See also Keller, supra note 27, at 653 (noting that "China's funda-

mental statutes are often drafted in general or abstract form" so that their implementation depends on additional central and regional legislation). Another
possible explanation for China's use of general language is that "Chinese codes
and other legislation are deliberately written in simple language so that their
interpretation can be made by minimally educated judges or bureaucrats."
Leung, supra note 59, at 106.
135 The "provisional" designation "does not mean that it has less legal force

than one which has not been so qualified; it only indicates the intention that the
enactment is of an experimental nature and will probably be revised in due
course on the basis of experience gained in the course of implementation."
CHN, supra note 21, at 90. See also Ross & Siuc, supra note 16, at 11 (listing

environmental statutes that were still "in process" as of 19S7); Leung, supra
note 59, at 107 (attributing the use of provisional statutes to a desire "to maintain flexibility in order to implement the policies of the State or Communist
Party").
136 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
137 Stewart, supra note 66, at 559-60 ("[W]e now see deadlines and entitlements deliberately written into legislative mandates, to be invoked by litigants
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Environmental statutes that do not fit the national paradigm
exist in both countries. Increasingly, the detail in some Chinese
environmental statutes rivals that of many U.S. environmental
statutes. 138 On the other hand, key provisions in some U.S. environmental statutes are written in extremely general language.
For example, CERCLA's liability scheme encompasses "owners," "operators," and those who "arrange ...for disposal ...
of hazardous substances"-categories that have spawned considerable litigation to determine which parties satisfy the statutory
definition and which do not.139
But the existence of general environmental statutes in China
versus specific statutes in the United States suggests that China
should have more statutory interpretation disputes than the
United States, not fewer. For example, China's Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Law provides that "[e]nterprises and
other undertakings which cause serious water pollution must
eliminate pollution within a stipulated time. 1 40 What constitutes
'"serious" water pollution is not self-evident,141 nor is the meaning of "enterprises and other undertakings." Does that include
farms and other nonpoint sources of pollution? Does "eliminating pollution" require that all wastes be eliminated, or only those
that harm the environment? The U.S. Clean Water Act, by contrast, specifies in much greater detail the type and amount of pollution that particular sources may emit through the procedures
for establishing effluent limitations and water quality standards
and through the permit process. 42 Additionally, the Clean
Water Act compels any point source to obtain a permit stating
to propel a reluctant executive forward."). The statutory deadlines mentioned

by Professor Stewart constitute the clearest example of provisions inviting suits
against the government, but the use of specific language to define the substantive reach of the statute has a similar effect both in challenges to agency regulations implementing the statute and in disputes between private parties.
138

See Cai & Voigts, supra note 17, at S-18 (suggesting that "China's envi-

ronmental laws usually include strict, detailed standards").
139 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (1994). See generally John C. Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MANN.L. REv. 1493 (1994) (describing cases arising
under CERCLA's liability scheme).
140 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, art. 38 (1984), reprinted in
Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 311.
141 See Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 232 (noting the difficulties in determining what constitutes "serious" pollution).
142 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301-02, 307, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311-12, 1317 (1994) (effluent limitations); Federal Water Pollution Control

Act. §§ 303-303(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313-1313(a) (1994) (water quality standards).
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the exact amount of each substance that may be discharged into
the water. 143
A further explanation as to why the United States continues
to see countless cases involving the interpretation of its environmental statutes lies in the process of statutory interpretation.
Parties will contest a statute's meaning-even its apparently
plain meaning-in at least two related situations. First, where
courts have demonstrated a willingness to interpret statutes contrary to the apparent statutory language, parties will argue that
their case is one in which the court should do so again. 144 Second, if the context in which the statute applies has effectively
changed so that parties are adversely affected as a result, then the
affected parties will seek to have the court recognize such
changes in its interpretation of the statute. In other words, if the
courts allow the meaning of statutes to evolve over time, as numerous theories of statutory interpretation now propose,145 then
the number of statutory interpretation cases will always increase
because there is always a chance that the court will reinterpret
the statute.
The task of interpreting a statute never ends, regardless of
one's theory of statutory interpretation. The plain meaning of a
statute may apply in situations that the drafters of the statute did
not anticipate. Professor Stewart's example of the Refuse Act of
1899 shows how one statutory provision-prohibiting the discharge of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state"-that was aimed at impediments to

143 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 401-05, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-45
(1994) (permit procedures).
144 Cases famous for their refusal to heed the plain statutory language include United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (interpreting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act to permit voluntary affirmative action programs), and
Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (reading an
1885 act to allow a New York City church to arrange to bring an English pastor
to work in the United States).
145 See, ag., GuiDo CALABREsi, A COMION LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTrEs (1982); WmLmIA N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAmc STATUoRY INTE1PRETATION (1994); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICHi. L. REv. 20 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989). I respond to these theories in my
review of Professor Eskridge's book, John C. Nagle, Newt Gingridi, Dynamic
Statutory Interpreter,143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209 (1995).
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navigation could be used in environmental cases seventy years
146
after Congress enacted the statute.
One more feature of Chinese environmental statutes operates to discourage cases challenging their implementation: many
statutes are not published. This is especially true of regional and
local legislation, which foreign entities often discover only after
local authorities claim that it has been violated. 147 Challenging
the government's interpretation of such "secret" legislation
presents a formidable challenge to unknowing violators. Moreover, the ability of local authorities to disclose such statutes only
when it is convenient for them to do so enables them to attempt
enforcement only in clear cases where they are most likely to
prevail.
E. .Reliance on Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution
in China
Another reason that there are few environmental statutory
interpretation cases in China is that there are relatively few cases
of any kind that reach the Chinese courts. China has a long history of resolving disputes outside of court. That history continues today when environmental concerns collide with economic
development or other goals. Environmental disputes are usually
subjected to mediation, administrative arbitration proceedings,
and judicial efforts to craft a settlement before a final court judgment is pronounced. 148 Furthermore, the Chinese have used exhortational campaigns and sponsored huge voluntary public
works programs to address environmental issues, and the Chinese people have achieved notable environmental accomplishments by publicly pressuring polluters. 149 The Chinese
146 Stewart, supra note
RONMENTAL LAW 253-54

66, at 559. See also WILtAMH. RODGERS, JR., ENVI.
(2d ed. 1994) (referring to the Refuse Act's prohibition as being written in "primitive absolutes"). The true name of the Refuse
Act is the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899).
147 See Keller, supra note 27, at 683; Leung, supra note 59, at 108.
148 See, eg., Ma, supra note 55, at 278; Ross & SILK, supra note 16, at 7-8,
243, 247-48; see also Yang, supra note 47, at 179 (noting that "[e]nvironmental
protection officials claim that over 90 percent of their actions are accepted by
the parties concerned").
149 The exhortational campaigns are described in Ross.& SILK, supra note
16, at 15-20, 243; Ottley & Valauskas, supra note 16, at 92-93; Ross & SILN,

supra 16, at 105 n.195 (giving examples of 90,000 people removing 400,000 tons
of sediment from a polluted river in a week and the construction of a sewage
diversion project by local residents); Stewart, supra note 66, at 566 (noting that
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government has even advocated an expansion of the role of the
media in exposing both violations of environmental law and the
inadequacy of sanctions for such violations. 50 China views education as being on par with enforcement in importance as a
means of achieving environmental goals?15 ' China turns to the
law only when all else fails, and it yields a judicial decision implementing the law only if other efforts to resolve a case prove unsuccessful. The recent push to modernize the legal system and to
promote the enforcement of Chinese environmental statutes coexists with this long tradition of resolving disputes outside of
court.
The United States turns to the courts much more readily to
resolve environmental disputes. This is due in part to the fact
that many people in the United States rely on litigation to solve
almost every type of dispute, and in part to the fact that the sophisticated court system makes litigation more palatable. It is
true that the example set by societies like China looks increasingly attractive as an alternative to litigation, including environmental litigation where CERCLA cases may involve hundreds of
parties. Nonetheless, environmental disputes are still far more
likely to result in judicial decisions in the United States than in
China.
F. Alternative Vehicles for Announcing JudicialInterpretations
of Environmental Statutes
The remaining explanations for the lack of Chinese environmental statutory interpretation cases are more mundane. There
may be many more such cases decided by the courts than are
documented, but the exact number would be hard to establish.
Chinese courts do not write detailed opinions explaining their
decisions as frequently as courts write such opinions in the
United States. 152 Even when a court does produce a detailed
"[a]Ilready there have been many instances where public protests have shut
down polluting factories.").
150 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 21.
151 AGENDA 21, supra note 4, at 19 (calling for increased public education
about environmental laws); Strengthens Environmental Protection, Xinhua

News Agency Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File
(quoting Qu Geping, director of NEPA, as stating that "education is as important as enforcement in protecting the national environment").
152 See Keller, supra note 27, at 686 ("For the Western observer, the most
important deficiency is surely the large body of laws and interpretations of laws
which remain publicly unavailable."); Xia Chen, Maritime Oil Pollution in the
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written opinion, the opinion often goes unreported. Judicial
precedents do not enjoy the same status as law in China as they
do in the United States. It is thus conceivable that there are
more cases interpreting Chinese environmental statutes than are
readily available. But, for all of the reasons discussed above, this
is highly unlikely.
Another explanation for the lack of cases interpreting environmental statutes is that Chinese courts publish other types of
documents explaining how they interpret a statute.15 3 For example, the Transportation Division of the Supreme People's Court
recently held a workshop addressing the interpretation of the
statutes of limitations contained in the Maritime Code, including
the statute of limitation for bringing oil pollution claims. The
conclusions were not contained in an official judicial interpretation of the statute and thus are not entitled to binding effect, but
it appears likely that the judges involved will follow the agreed
approach.15 4 If this occurred frequently in China, it could explain the dearth of judicial decisions interpreting China's environmental statutes, but there is no indication that the courts have
employed that device to clarify the ambiguities in other Chinese
environmental statutes.
IV
LESSONS FOR CHINA AND THE UNIT'ED STAIES

The absence of cases interpreting China's environmental
statutes is not necessarily detrimental. Such cases are not themselves a social good. Nonetheless, the reasons why China has so
few environmental law statutory interpretation cases and why the
United States has so many offer several lessons for each country,
and for theories of statutory interpretation.
China needs to enforce its environmental statutes. It needs
stronger enforcement mechanisms, stronger sanctions for violators, and the political will to enforce its statutes. The Chinese
government also needs to gain control over the economy
People's Republic of China. The Legal Framework of the Liability and Compensation Scheme, 6 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 449, 453-454 (1994). The Supreme Peo-

ple's Court does publish an official quarterly gazette that contains its cases and
a selection of lower court cases. See Keller, supra note 27, at 669 n.71.
153 See Keller, supra note 27, at 669.
154 The workshop is described in Mark Morrison & Luo Hai, China Clouds

Issue Over Time Extensions on Marine Claims, Reuters, Aug. 2 1995, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters Textline Translated Sources File.
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throughout the country. China is already doing many of these
things and is working toward the others, but the tension between
economic development and environmental progress makes each

step toward stricter environmental enforcement difficult. Nor
can Chinese courts be expected to mediate between the political
branches in environmental cases any time soon. As China continues to train its judges, familiarize all governmental officials
with the requirements of environmental statutes, and educate the
public about environmental issues, the country's suffocating pollution and ecological destruction will diminish accordingly.
The United States needs to recognize that there are other
ways to achieve environmental goals aside from litigation. The
push for increased reliance on alternative dispute resolution in
U.S. environmental cases indicates an awareness that the traditional Chinese approach to resolving societal conflicts has its virtues. The United States also needs to develop new ways to
promote voluntary compliance with environmental statutes, such
as the environmental audits now encouraged by numerous state
statutes. 5 5 China's emphasis on environmental, education merits
attention in the United States as well. The overwhelming consensus that supported the United States' environmental statutes
when they were first enacted in the early 1970s has dissolved into
bitter political, regional, and partisan disputes between assorted
economic and environmental interests. Perhaps the best environmental statutes and the best enforcement structure in the world
are of minimal utility if the public no longer supports their
implementation.
China's story also offers lessons for statutory interpretation.
Professor Stewart guesses that "[a] complete collection of articles
on statutory interpretation in China would not fill more than
twenty pages at the back of an N.Y U. EnvironmentalLaw Journal,"1 5 6 and he is not far off.1s7 Statutory interpretation simply
has not been important in China. The evidence that does exist
shows that China follows a different system of statutory interpretation than the United States. One professor cautions that
155

See, eg.,

CAL. HEALTH

&

SAFETY CODE § 25570

CODE AmN. § 13-10-3-1 (Burns 1995);

(Deering 1995);

IND.

Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 13 (Smith-

Hurd 1996).

Stewart, supra note 66, at 566.
157 The only English discussions of statutory interpretation in China that I
156

have found are in CHEN, supranote 21, at 95, and Keller, supranote 27, at 66669, 679-80, 684-85.
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China's approach may seem "peculiar" to western observers "because the concept of 'interpretation' adopted is quite different
from that accepted in common law or even civil law jurisdictions,
and because the system is clearly inconsistent with the principle
of separations of powers, judicial interpretation and the rule of
law as understood in many countries in the contemporary
world."' 58 That China gives all three branches of government
and the Communist Party a role in the interpretation of statutes,
allows interpretations that ignore legislative intent; encourages
the courts to consult the legislature and administrative agencies
to reach a consensus interpretation; and grants little authority to
prior judicial interpretations. 159 Support for these characteristics
of China's system can be found in the works of U.S. statutory
interpretation theorists who advocate widely shared interpretive
authority, reject original intent as the touchstone for statutory
interpretation, consult contemporary values as reflected in the
preferences of the legislature and the executive, and reject stare
decisis in statutory cases. 60 Numerous judicial decisions reflect
these beliefs. Therefore, despite the lack of Chinese environmental law cases, the end results of statutory interpretation in the
United States may not be as different from those in China as one
might suspect.
V
CONCLUSION

China faces enormous environmental challenges during the
coming decades. China's rapid economic development and its
continued population growth mean that it will have to improve
its environmental performance. China's leadership is acutely
aware of this. For the past fifteen years, it has worked to instill
an environmental ethic necessary to promote a more sustainable
development. China has also enacted numerous environmental
statutes-legislation that would have been unthinkable only a
few years ago-and has worked to create a legal system capable
of implementing them. The absence of cases interpreting those
environmental laws demonstrates that China has not yet succeeded, but it is moving in the right direction.
158 CiN, supra note 21, at 95.
159 See supra Part II.B.
160 See, e.g., Johh C. Nagle, CorrectionsDay, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1286-87
(1996); Nagle, supra note 145, at 2218-20.
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The United States faces many environmental challenges as
well. One of those challenges may be that of preserving the environmental laws that Congress enacted with such overwhelming
support only twenty-five years ago. Those laws are undoubtedly
important, but the Chinese example shows that statutes wiU not
solve environmental problems if a country lacks the institutions
and the will to enforce them. The institutions exist in the United
States, but public support for the application of environmental
laws is mixed. Strict enforcement under such circumstances vAill
in6vitably lead to conflict.
. Statutory interpretation may seem esoteric in light
of such
practical concerns, but it is not. A more flexible, dynamic approach to interpreting environmental statutes would tend to
ameliorate the current political controversy, permitting application of the statutes in a manner that satisfies Congress, EPA,
other executive agencies, and the public at large. That approach
may facilitate the application of the statutes in difficult circumstances, but it is unlikely to be fully satisfactory to those who
support the statutes as written and those who want to rewrite the
statutes. Conversely, a more formal, textualist approach to interpreting environmental statutes will create more controversy as
the statutes produce unpopular results, but in so doing it will also
frame the issues for legislative reconsideration of the law. The
choice between interpretive approaches, therefore, vill influence
whether the courts, Congress, or EPA face the most pressure to
update environmental statutes and to correct provisions that are
now viewed as statutory mistakes. 161 One way or another, the
environmental law of the United States will change-and so will
that of China. What that change will look like will be revealed in
the nature of the disputes about the interpretation of each country's environmental statutes.

161

See generally Nagle, supra note 160.
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